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Abstract 
This article analyzes the role of interpersonal discussion networks and television as the key 
mediators of political information that can potentially drive citizens’ electoral choices. The 
research relies on survey data of Italian voters in the aftermath of the 2006 general election. 
Findings show that the partisan intensity of discussion networks significantly affects the vote, so 
that citizens embedded in homogeneous partisan networks are more influenced than those who 
discuss politics within heterogeneous networks that do not uniformly support a unified political 
position. The effects of television news programs and talk shows turn out to be comparatively 
smaller than those of interpersonal networks, but are still significant for those programs and 
formats that attract politically diverse audiences. We interpret this result as a consequence of the 
increasing relevance of selective exposure in the Italian electorate, which has largely been 
documented by previous research. Thus, while the effects of interpersonal discussion networks seem 
to depend on the degree of their partisan intensity, the impact of television seems to be enhanced, in 
the Italian context, by a program’s ability to present itself as less openly biased than most of the 
competitors, thus failing to elicit selective exposure by the viewers. The main implication of this 
study is that interpersonal communication has a remarkable influence on citizens’ choices, and it 
should be studied together with mass communication, as they both constitute crucial components of 
voters’ information environments, although their effects depend on partially different factors. 
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1. The informed voter and democracy1  
 
Democratic theory requires voters to be informed and aware of the substantially decisive 
importance of their vote. Therefore, it is essential to identify the quality and the dimension of the 
information flow that comes to the voters through so-called intermediaries, especially the mass 
media and personal networks. By complementing each other, both these intermediaries jointly 
contribute to creating the informational context that shapes political behavior and voting choices. 
Our study aims to analyze such an intermediation process by focusing on the characteristics of the 
intermediation context and its influence on voting choices. Following Beck (1991) and Beck et al. 
(2002), we are convinced that personal and media intermediaries should be taken into account 
simultaneously. This belief guided the survey investigation and the analysis of the data presented in 
our paper. Since most studies of voting behavior in Italy have paid little attention to personal 
networks we will, however, focus more intensively on the role of the discussion networks. 
Therefore, our primary object of analysis will be "the information received through social 
interaction, the characteristics of the relationships through which political information is conveyed, 
and the types of people who serve as political communicators" (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, 108). 
In past decades, Italy was characterized by the existence of politically and socially cohesive 
communities capable of exercising very powerful influence on voting behavior. The two 
predominant parties, the Christian Democratic party (DC) and the Communist party (PCI), the 
Catholic church, and trade unions, thanks to their extensive and entrenched networks largely 
dominated the process of political communication, especially at the grass-roots level. Therefore, the 
investigation of the nature of the social structure and of its influence was always central to the 
analysis of voting behavior. In particular, a substantial and influential body of research took into 
account the remarkable differences between political traditions and cultures of Italian regional areas 
(Spreafico and LaPalombara 1963; Poggi 1968; Galli 1968; Parisi and Pasquino 1977; Corbetta, 
Parisi and Schadee 1988; Cartocci 1990; Diamanti 1993). However, notwithstanding the 
fundamental assumption that individual political behavior was mediated by social groups, most 
early research on voting by Italian scholars rarely addressed the mechanisms of this process of 
intermediation.  
When the model of the Michigan School and of the American National Electoral Studies 
crossed the ocean and set the course of electoral research in other democracies (Zuckerman 2005, 
                                                
1 We are very grateful to Ilvo Diamanti, Luigi Ceccarini, Fabio Bordignon, and to the anonymous reviewers for their 
many helpful suggestions. We would also like to thank Valerio Vanelli for assistance with the data analysis. A previous 
version of this paper was presented by Donatella Campus and Gianfranco Pasquino at WAPOR Regional Seminar on 
“Public Opinion, Communication and Elections”, Israel 26-29 June 2007. 
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11), the research agenda in Italy absorbed the mainstream approach according to which social 
groups – intended as large-scale groups like social class, religion, political organizations – become 
objects of individual identification (Mannheimer and Sani 1987 and 1994; Parisi and Schadee 1995; 
Corbetta and Parisi 1997; Itanes 2001; Caciagli and Corbetta 2002). Practically no research was 
devoted to the analysis of the internal dynamics of small social groups, like family, friends, co-
workers, peer groups, and neighbors2. The mechanisms for the transmission of information through 
face-to-face contacts remained substantially not explored. The intuitions and formulations of the 
early studies of the Columbia School, in particular, Katz and Lazarsfeld's (1955) famous hypothesis 
of the two-step communication flow, received little attention. 
Likewise, research on the role of the other intermediary agent, the mass media, in shaping 
voting choices started in Italy quite late. In the so-called First Republic (1946-1992), the role played 
by the mass media prevented any kind of research to consider them as a factor in elections: while 
newspapers were mostly owned by the private sector, from its beginning, in the late 1950s, 
television was a state monopoly. Political parties controlled entirely the public television 
broadcasting system whose electoral role remained limited and scarcely influential for many years 
to come. In addition, the emergence of a private sector broadcasting company in the second half of 
the ‘80s did not significantly change this state of affairs. Although television brought some 
innovation to the style of campaigning, it did not alter any fundamental aspect of the political 
system nor did it challenge the supremacy of parties as major actors in the political game (Mancini 
1993; Mancini and Mazzoleni 1995; Corbetta and Mazzoleni 1995).  
As a consequence of the radical changes in the party system that occurred in the early '90s 
and the rapid mediatization of electoral campaigns, television began to cover political events, 
especially electoral campaigns, with a new approach. For the first time, the mass media turned 
Italian elections into shows (Mazzoleni 1996). At the same time, following the formation of two 
main coalitions and the emergence of bipolar competition, political elites discovered the importance 
of direct appeals to the voters in order to attract electoral consensus. As new or transformed 
political actors, parties and coalitions needed to be introduced to the public in the most rapid and 
effective way. For this reason, especially in the first phase of the transition, the media coverage of 
electoral campaigns served as an indispensable source of information. As a consequence of this 
revolution, studies on the impact of television on Italian elections multiplied, especially after Silvio 
Berlusconi, the tycoon of Italian commercial television, entered the political arena (Ricolfi 1994; 
Sani and Segatti 1997; Sani 2001; Legnante 2002; Legnante 2006). In several studies, the role of 
                                                
2 Some glimpses with special reference to clientelist networks can be found in Tarrow 1967; Zuckerman 1975. 
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mass media has been sometimes overemphasized as if Italian voters, deprived of their traditional 
party references, drew their political information almost exclusively from television.  
However, if one focuses on the role of information sources in influencing political choice, it 
appears evident that the political information coming from newspapers, television and the new 
media is only a part of a broader context in which interpersonal communication also plays a 
significant role. Therefore, even if the old social and political networks have been weakened and 
changed in nature after the collapse of the political system in early '90s, the existence of 
communication networks may still prove to be capable of influencing political opinions and 
filtering media messages. The line of research started by Huckfeldt and Sprague’s (1995) seminal 
book found new evidence of the main assertion advanced by Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955): citizens 
are interdependent in the sense that they depend on one another for information and advice. 
Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) identified individuals' micro-environmental surroundings as one of 
the main intermediaries of voting choices. The difference from traditional research carried out by 
studies of the Columbia School (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944) is that the focus is on discussion networks 
rather than on social groups. Networks have the characteristic of not being self-contained, that is, 
they are capable of accommodating the fact that individuals do not usually belong to a single group, 
but to multiple groups that are sometimes open to different political directions (Huckfeldt et al. 
2004, 18). Moreover, citizens experience their social settings in bits and pieces, that is to say they 
obtain their information through a series of exchanges with a number of people with whom they 
share a social space. As a consequence, "the central political tendency of a particular setting is 
never experienced directly, but it is rather reconstructed on the basis of the fragmented experiences 
that are differentially weighted in ways that are idiosyncratic to both recipient and the source of the 
information. This view marks an extension and perhaps a departure from a rich tradition of 
contextual studies in which individuals are seen as responding, more or less directly, to the political 
climate within which they reside" (Huckfeldt et al. 2004, 31). 
This approach is especially appropriate for analyzing a context such as the current Italian 
one where the political transition provoked so many changes in the political scenario with the 
decline of old social and political references and the emergence of new ones still in a constant 
evolution. Where organizations decline in quantity and in quality, that is, in their numbers and in 
their ability to structure the transmission of political communication, chances are that interpersonal 
networks will occupy the newly free space. In addition, we would suggest that, in any case, the 
analysis of discussion networks should complement research on the role of the mass media in 
shaping voting choices3. As Beck et al. (2002, 57) have observed, "alternative sources of 
                                                
3 A similar argument has been advanced also by Lenart (1994, 40-41).  
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information typically vary in the extent to which they carry distinctive political biases. By relying 
on one information source rather than another, citizens are more or less likely to encounter 
information that encourages some choices and outcomes while it discourages others". Therefore, 
analyzing both intermediaries simultaneously should allow us to acquire better knowledge on what 
could not be known by just relying on separate analyses.  
Our research has been designed to study the influence of social networks during the 
campaign for parliamentary elections, which were held on 9-10 April 2006. To address a range of 
issues related to interpersonal and media communication and voting choices, we carried out three 
nationally representative surveys conducted through a self-administered mail questionnaire in 
November 2005, February 2006 and May 2006 (see details in the Appendix). Moreover, we also 
carried out a number of focus groups a few weeks before the election. In this paper, we will focus 
mainly on data drawn from the post-electoral survey (N=1270). In particular, our surveys were 
designed to include a battery of questions investigating the frequency of discussion, the identity of 
the discussants, their social characteristics, political orientation and expertise, and the amount of 
congruence and dissonance between discussion partners. In this regard, the present study addresses 
two questions: 1) what were the characteristics of Italian voters’ discussion networks in the 2006 
elections? 2) what was the relationship between the degree of partisan homogeneity of discussion 
networks and voters’ choices in 2006? 
 
2. Interpersonal discussion networks in the 2006 Italian election 
 
The first objective of our study is to answer the question whether the partisan bias of interpersonal 
discussion networks influences people's voting choices. We formulate the hypothesis that the 
political composition of the respondents' discussion networks exerts an impact on their voting 
choices. We expect such an effect to be reinforced when networks are homogeneous, though weaker 
when networks are mixed. The studies conducted by the Columbia School (Berelson et al. 1954, 98-
101) have already stressed that dissonant views are more likely to intrude when individuals are 
embedded in a mixed environment. According to Schmitt-Beck (2003, 237), the homogeneous 
discussion networks appear to have a significant impact because they can reinforce media messages 
consonant with the networks’ political orientation as well as inhibit messages that are dissonant 
with it. By contrast, if voters regularly interact with people having different views, they are more 
likely to take into consideration contrasting messages. As Huckfeldt et al. (2004, 212) argued, 
"citizens who encounter politically diverse messages are more likely to hold intense but balanced 
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(or ambivalent) views regarding politics and political candidates, and they are less likely to hold 
intense and polarized (or partisan) views".  
In constructing interpersonal discussion networks in our research, we use detailed 
information and evaluations given by the respondents with reference to their discussion networks. 
Following Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995), we argue that people with whom one has a close 
relationship, especially relatives and friends, play a special role in influencing a person’s political 
views. For this reason, we asked respondents to identify the person with whom they most frequently 
discussed political news during the 2006 Italian electoral campaign. As shown in table 1, our 
respondents were more likely to name their most frequent political discussant among family 
members, with a clear preference for their spouse. This is not really surprising since much previous 
research underscored the fact that people discuss politics predominantly with their spouses or live-
in partners (Beck 1991; Straits 1991; Zuckerman et al. 1998; Zuckerman et al. 2007). Regarding 
this, spatial proximity is considered a factor which explains, for instance, frequent discussion with 
co-workers (Beck 1991; Straits 1991). It should be stressed that the gender difference turned out to 
be definitively significant. In fact, women reporting they usually talk mostly with their husband are 
more numerous than men who state that they discuss politics with their wife. More generally, the 
large majority of women (77.5%) choose their political discussant within the family circle 
(husbands or other relatives). By contrast, almost half of men (42%) prefer to talk with a friend, a 
colleague, someone not related to them by blood or marriage. The greater accessibility is certainly a 
factor in determining the choice of the discussant within the family circle. Living together often 
leads to exposure to the same messages and stimuli, i.e. watching TV news together. Clearly, this 
may encourage political discussion among people in the same household.  
It should also be taken into consideration that in Italy there has been a decline of some types 
of political participation that offer many opportunities to discuss politics outside the inner circle of 
family and friends, especially, party and trade union membership (see data in Scarrow 2000). This 
phenomenon is partly due to a general trend in all Western European democracies, but it can be 
explained also as a consequence of the collapse of the Italian party system in the early ‘90s. As for 
the Catholic Church, an organization that has always enjoyed political power and cultural 
prominence/influence in Italy (also through the once strong Christian Democratic party), it should 
be observed that involvement in religious activities has declined, i.e. the number of people who 
regularly attend religious ceremonies has decreased over time (Pisati 2000). This decline has 
resulted in significant consequences because for a long time Italian parishes played several roles in 
terms of socialization and communication. Their social activities, always bordering with political 
activities, often had spillover effects especially because in many areas political opinions, ideas and 
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preferences were exchanged and several priests were trusted and could play, as indicated by Dogan 
(1963), deliberately or not, but certainly not unexpectedly, the role of opinion-leaders. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The second main reason why people may prefer an intimate discussant can be found in the 
so-called political homophily, that is to say the tendency to select politically like-minded discussion 
partners (Beck 1991; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz and Martin 2001). It is well known that, 
when it comes to their political viewpoints, married couples tend to influence each other (Stoker 
and Jennings 2005) and, in general, families are a source of political ties through the 
intergenerational transmission of political participation (Verba et al. 2005). Therefore, the choice of 
the most frequent discussant within the family may be driven by the preference for reinforcing 
interactions with people who share similar political views. Such a desire to avoid conflicts and 
controversial topics, particularly in the political field, tends to lead people to talk politics only with 
discussants who are very familiar and/or who hold consonant opinions. The typical reaction of those 
who are embedded in an environment characterized by opposite political views is to foreclose 
discussion before it begins (MacKuen 1990; Noelle-Neumann 1984). Conover, Searing and Crewe 
(2002) also found out that those who often talk politics within their family and in social occasions 
with their friends avoid discussing political issues at social gatherings with people whom they do 
not know very well. For this reason, we tested the hypothesis that the choice of the most frequent 
discussant is driven by the consonance of political opinions. In order to measure the degree of 
political agreement between respondents and their selected discussant, we also asked respondents to 
assess the political orientation of the aforementioned discussant. By matching such an assessment 
with the respondents' own ideological self-evaluations (see Appendix), we were able to observe a 
clear predominance of consonant dyads, that is to say, holding similar political views (64.3%).  
In order to construct political discussion networks, however, "it is important to look beyond 
the most intimate discussants" (Beck et al. 2002, 61). In fact, discussants outside the family circle, 
i.e. friends (Kotler-Berkowitz 2005) and co-workers (Straits 1991; Beck 1991), may also influence 
one's opinions in a significant way (Levine 2005). In general, it is more likely that social 
acquaintances hold dissonant views and provide an opportunity for dissonant messages to intrude. 
As a consequence, some people are forced to engage in a critical examination of the substance of 
their political disagreements (Granovetter 1973; Levine 2005). As Beck (1991, 378-9) observes, 
"personal networks of political discussants provide protective cocoons for an individual's 
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preferences (…) This cocoon is more likely to be penetrated, however, as one's network expands 
beyond the walls of home and family into the broader world". 
We asked our discussants if they considered themselves embedded: (i) in a homogeneous 
consonant discussion network, composed mostly of people who hold their same political views; or 
(ii) in a homogeneous dissonant network, composed mostly of people who hold opposing political 
views; or (iii) in a mixed discussion network composed of some people with similar views and 
some other with differing views. Despite the partisan bias that may affect the evaluations of the 
respondents, leading them to overstate the degree of agreement within their own networks, and in a 
partial departure from respondent’s assessments of their most frequent discussant, we found that 
more than the majority of respondents do not believe that the people with whom they discuss 
politics lean homogeneously to one political side. While 35 percent of the respondents declared that 
they talk mostly with people who share their own views, only few of them (about 11%) reported to 
be embedded in homogenous dissonant groups. The majority of respondents (53.9%) claimed that 
overall the people they talk to are politically heterogeneous, with half sharing their views and half 
not. By combining the levels of agreement between respondents and both their most frequent 
discussant and their larger discussion circles, we find that, while 59.2% claim to be located in 
consonant networks, 12.8% report partial disagreement and a remarkable 28% claim to be in full 
disagreement with their discussion partners. This finding is consistent with previous research on 
political disagreement (Schmitt-Beck 2003; Huckfeldt et al. 2004) that has stressed the existence of 
a remarkable amount of disagreement within political communication networks not only in the 
United States, but in other democracies as well. 
Building on previous analyses, which have argued that perceived discussants’ opinions are a 
reliable proxy for their actual views (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, Huckfeldt et al. 2004), our data 
measure respondents’ perceptions of their discussion partners’ political opinions. Huckfeldt and 
Sprague (1995, 124-145) found that these perceptions tend to be fairly accurate and that limited 
amounts of reporting bias depend on individuals’ projection of their attitudes on others – which 
suggests that the degree of agreement between respondents and their discussants might be slightly 
overestimated in our research – and on asymmetrical contextual factors, whereby “members of the 
political minority accurately perceive members of the majority, whereas members of the majority 
do not accurately perceive members of the minority” (1995, 143). This pattern results in significant 
suppression effects of rare minority viewpoints, an aspect that does not directly concern our 
analysis since we are investigating the effects on voting for the two mainstream coalitions, 
excluding third parties. Similarly, both Beck et al. (2002, 61) and Mutz and Martin (2001, 103) find 
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modest distortion effects in respondents’ perceptions of their discussion partners’ opinions in the 
same direction as did Huckfeldt and Sprague4.  
 One interesting phenomenon that emerges from our data is that voters with different 
ideological leanings tend to encounter significantly different discussion environments in terms of 
their consonance or dissonance. Table 2 shows the relationship between respondents’ ideological 
self-placement, measured on a 1-10 left-right scale and aggregated in five categories, and a 
combined measure of their agreement with both their preferred discussant and their extended 
discussion network. The data reveal the existence of a relationship between respondents’ 
ideological extremity and their exposure to homogeneous discussion networks similar to the U-
shaped relationship found by Mutz and Martin (2001, 105-6)5. Thus, individuals who have stronger 
ideological beliefs tend to encounter a smaller proportion of dissenting views than those who are 
more weakly aligned. This pattern is particularly pronounced for centrist voters, who report 
interacting with a majority of dissonant discussants. Moreover, conservative voters, especially those 
locating themselves on centre-right positions, claim to encounter much fewer supporting voices in 
their discussion networks than voters who place themselves on the left or centre-left. Conservative 
voters’ perception of isolation in political discussion is quite an accurate reflection of the reality of 
interpersonal communication in Italy. Indeed, our data show that voters who identify themselves as 
leftist are twice as likely than self-identified rightists to claim that they discuss politics frequently 
(43.5% to 21.4%). At this point, one can only speculate on the possible causes of this phenomenon 
referring to the historically strong presence of the left, thanks to the unions, in work environments 
such as factories, schools and the public administration in general, and to the cultural heritage of the 
1960s and 1970s protest movements, which shaped political rhetoric and discourse among today’s 
adult generations. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
3. The role of discussion networks in the 2006 vote 
 
Up to this point, our analysis of the characteristics of Italians’ networks of discussion has shown 
that a significant percentage of voters encounter different views when they talk to other people, 
                                                
4 Moreover, Huckfeldt et al. (2004, 91) show that both the accessibility and accuracy of judgments on others’ political 
views increase as the campaign progresses, a finding that supports the validity of our data since the survey was 
administered in the immediate aftermath of the election, where voters’ learning curve reached its peak. Finally, since 
our study focuses on the effects of political discussion, it is important to note that such effects have been found to 
depend entirely on respondents’ perceptions of discussants’ opinions rather than on their actual views (Huckfeldt and 
Sprague 1995, 173). 
5 A Chi-square test and Phi and Cramer’s V measures reveal the relationship to be significant at the .000 level. 
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which do not often confirm their own political predispositions and thus create the opportunity for 
some persuasion to occur. We now turn to investigating whether this potential for interpersonal 
influence was in fact realized in the 2006 election, what was the magnitude of the phenomenon, and 
how it compares with the other main political intermediary: television. 
Table 3 presents the results of three logit regression models predicting the vote for one of 
the two coalitions which competed in the 2006 election (coded as centre-left=1; centre-right=0). 
Model 1 is limited to standard socio-demographic variables, such as gender, age, size of the town of 
residence, education, and professional status. Model 2 builds on Model 1 by adding respondents’ 
interest in politics and the two crucial blocks of variables for our study, which account for the main 
political communication intermediaries: discussion networks and mass media. Model 3 introduces 
political ideology, measured in terms of self-location along the left-right continuum. We have 
chosen to assume ideology as the crucial control variable since, in all likelihood, ideology is to be 
regarded as the current driving force of the Italian vote. Following the collapse of the Italian party 
system around 1993-1994 and the disappearance and/or significant transformation of the traditional 
parties, willingly or unwillingly, all Italian voters had to redefine their relationships with the more 
or less new party organizations. Since no party identification could be reshaped nor re-emphasized, 
it became highly flexible and conditioned by several factors such as the personality of national 
leaders, the candidates in single-member constituencies and the coalitions. Indeed, Italian voters 
have found it easier to identify themselves in one of the two, though broad and quite heterogeneous, 
coalitions of the centre-right and the centre-left, rather than reviving a strong party identity. For this 
reason, we have also decided not to include into the model a proper measure of party identification 
that for many voters probably does not retain a meaning independent from the coalitional alliances.  
Political opinions may and do change, but most often, they remain bounded within each 
coalition and rarely entail a decision to cross the borders (Bardi 2006; Natale 2007). While a certain 
instability persists concerning the vote for individual parties, ideological orientations have become 
quite stable and polarized6 (Schadee and Segatti 2002; Sani 2006; Baldassarri 2007). Elections have 
often been won because of the ability of some leaders to create the most encompassing of 
coalitions, which are now perceived by citizens as the main actors of electoral competition 
(Baldassarri and Schadee 2004). Building on such a body of empirical evidence, we assume that 
political ideology is antecedent to voting choice, that is to say, voters do not locate themselves on 
the scale of political ideology by generalizing from their vote, but rather make their electoral 
choices based on their ideological affiliations. Since we expect ideology to emerge to a large extent 
as the most powerful predictor of the vote, first, we have run Model 2 without ideology in order to 
                                                
6 The limited crossing between the major blocs has also been noted in Britain and Germany (Zuckerman et al. 2007). 
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single out the magnitude and the impact of the variables related to the communication 
intermediaries and, then, we have included ideology in Model 3 in order to measure the impact of 
personal networks and mass media in proportion to the influence of the ideological orientation, as 
well as to control for selective exposure effects that might affect the results in Model 2. 
As for the two blocs of variables related to the main intermediaries, discussion networks and 
mass media, the variable regarding the political composition of the respondents' discussion 
networks is constructed in order to account for the influence of both the most frequent discussant 
and the interpersonal network in general. By matching the political orientations of the respondent 
with his/her assessment of the consonance/dissonance of his/her views with the network of people 
with whom he/she commonly talks politics, we were able to assign an ideological bias to each 
respondent's network. Keeping in mind that the influence of the most frequent discussant should be 
regarded as deeper than that of people encountered on a less regular basis7, we have put together 
information on the ideological location of both the discussant and the network. By doing so, we 
have constructed a variable with five categories: (i) respondents embedded in a homogeneous leftist 
environment (with both the most frequent discussant and the network on the left or centre-left); (ii) 
respondents embedded in an environment with a prevalence of leftist discussants (with the most 
frequent discussant on the left and a mixed network); (iii) respondents embedded in a mixed 
environment (with the most frequent discussant and the network on the opposite sides); (iv) 
respondents embedded in an environment with a prevalence of rightist discussants (with the most 
frequent discussant on the left and a mixed network); (v) respondents embedded in a homogeneous 
rightist environment (with both the most frequent discussant and the network on the right). 
Frequencies of this cumulative network variable in the sample resulted as follows: Homogeneous 
Left (19.1%); Prevalent Left (27.6%); Mixed (17.5%); Prevalent Right (23.1%); Homogeneous 
Right (12.8%). Our starting hypothesis was that the ideological bias of the discussion networks has 
an influence on voting choices in the sense of filtering messages and providing voting cues. We 
expect this influence to be more pronounced in case of homogeneous networks, where the people 
are insulated from the influence of contrasting viewpoints, which may elicit a higher degree of 
group conformity, while mixed groups, because of their internal political diversity, are supposed to 
be less influential since the effectiveness with which a partisan opinion is communicated may be 
neutralized by other contrasting and equally partisan opinions transmitted by the full range of 
discussants. 
As for the second set of variables dealing with mass media intermediaries, it is worth noting 
that a particular emphasis is devoted to television. While diffusion of newspapers has always been 
                                                
7 A belief that has been confirmed by a number of logit regressions in which we included the two variables separately 
and found higher explanatory power for the most frequent discussant than for the extended discussion network. 
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limited, television is commonly regarded by Italians as their main source of political information 
(Legnante 2006). To explore the use of television for news coverage of the 2006 electoral 
campaign, we included a variable referring to the type and amount of exposure to television news. 
We took into consideration only TV news offered by the three channels of the State broadcasting 
company RAI and the three channels owned by Mediaset, the main Italian commercial network. 
Exposure to RAI and Mediaset TV news is widespread and, considered as a whole, the two media 
giants attract most of the viewing audience8. In the survey, we asked respondents to mention the 
two TV news programs they watch most frequently. In constructing our variable, we divided 
respondents into three groups: (i) those who either named two RAI news programs, or named a RAI 
program as their first option and did not answer the question on the second favorite news program; 
(ii) those who either named two Mediaset news programs, or named a Mediaset program as their 
first option and did not answer the question on the second favorite news program; (iii) those who 
named one RAI and one Mediaset news program, and are thus expected to receive the most diverse 
information diet. 
  Concerning the partisan bias of TV news, even though the State broadcasting company 
(RAI) ought to be committed to a rule of equal and balanced coverage of all parties and candidates, 
usually the incumbent government is expected to take advantage of the significant opportunities to 
influence the content of television messages. In 2006 the Casa delle Libertà, the centre-right 
coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi, was in control of the government and, therefore, enjoyed an 
advantageous position. As is well known, Mediaset, the largest pole of commercial television, was 
founded by Berlusconi and is still controlled by his family. It is difficult to demonstrate the 
existence of blatant partisan favoritism in news reports. However, some data from the Osservatorio 
di Pavia, which monitors the appearance time (“tempo di parola”) offered to leaders’ and 
candidates’ speeches and declarations, clearly show that the public service was quite balanced 
(46.8% to the centre-left vs 49.6% to the centre-right) even considering that the incumbent 
government usually is more visible than the opposition. RAI news programs, however, are quite 
differentiated in their coverage since the news on RAI3 (Channel 3) is notoriously more tilted to the 
left than the other two TV channels9. By contrast, the commercial television Mediaset openly 
                                                
8 According to Auditel, the institute in charge of monitoring TV audiences, in April 2006 – the month when the 
elections were held – the public service RAI totaled a share of 45.91% and Mediaset a share of 41.48%. Together they 
reached a share of 85.9% corresponding to 22,003,000 viewers (all together the other commercial TV channels had only 
3,610,000 viewers). Data source: http://www.primaonline.it. 
9 The disaggregated data for the three RAI TV news show that TG3 covered the Unione (centre-left) more than House 
of Liberties (centre-right): 49.3% vs.46.8% while the news on RAI1 and RAI2 did the opposite (TG1: 46.1% for the 
centre-left vs. 50.4% centre-right; TG2: 45.2% for the centre-left vs. 51.8% centre-right). Data source: Osservatorio di 
Pavia. 
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offered more space and visibility to the centre-right leaders (62.5%, as opposed to 33.5% to the 
centre-left)10.  
 Furthermore, we tested the effects of exposure to the main four talk shows that were 
broadcast during the 2006 election season11. Porta a Porta is the most famous program of this genre 
and has been running for more than a decade in the late-night block on RAI’s first channel. Its host 
is an experienced journalist who portrays politics in a traditional fashion and interprets his role as 
that of a “master of ceremonies” and adopts a deferential and gentle posture toward his guests. In 
the 2001 campaign, the program became controversial for allowing then-candidate Berlusconi to 
sign his “Contract with Italians” live in a pseudo-event that was fully orchestrated by his campaign, 
a move that alienated many center-left viewers of the show. In our sample, 23% claimed to watch it 
often and 42.1% to do so sometimes. Ballarò is a more recent prime-time production aired on RAI’s 
left-tilted third channel and its host is younger and more aggressive as he engages his guests, and 
for this reason is often charged with bias by centre-right politicians. 26.5% of our respondents said 
they watch it often and 41.1% sometimes. Matrix is Mediaset’s main late-night talk show and its 
host employs a dynamic, conversational style, by which he often interrupts his guests but rarely 
challenges them. 16.1% of our sample claimed to watch it often and 44.8% sometimes. Finally, 
Otto e Mezzo is the main prime-time political talk show broadcast by independent channel La7 and 
stands in contrast with the previous three by various counts. First, it lasts only one hour, while the 
others often run for longer than two hours. Second, it runs every day, while the others run either 
weekly (Ballarò) or three times a week (Porta a Porta and Matrix). Third, it has two hosts, one 
male and one female, both of whom clearly express their differing political views, the former 
conservative, the latter progressive, and often engage each other in spirited discussions. Otto e 
Mezzo is the least popular talk show among our respondents: 13.4% watch if often and 29.9% do so 
sometimes. Finally, our model also includes two other variables that measure, respectively, 
attention to articles about politics on newspapers and exposure to campaign communications by 
parties and candidates like posters and other propaganda materials. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
 
4. Discussion and Interpretation  
                                                
10 We thank the Osservatorio di Pavia and, in particular, its director Antonio Nizzoli and Professor Giacomo Sani for 
having kindly made these data available to us. 
11 One common feature of these programs is that, although they sometimes deal with everyday-life and entertainment 
issues, they clearly present themselves and are considered by most of the public as information programs, as opposed to 
tabloid entertainment shows and satirical programs. As in many other countries, tabloid and satirical shows often 
discuss political issues in Italy, but they are not the focus of our study. 
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As the analysis in Model 1 shows, socio-demographic variables display very little predictive power, 
even when they are considered in isolation from political and communication variables. Such an 
outcome was far from unexpected, as recent literature has highlighted a significant decline in the 
electoral influence of class, religious and territorial cleavages in Italy, while gender, age and 
education have always exercised modest effects on the vote (Corbetta 2006). By contrast, after 
including the communication intermediaries variables, the regression in Model 2 results much more 
explicative, with both blocks of variables related to the intermediaries appearing significant. The 
magnitude of the coefficients supports our hypothesis that the relationship is more remarkable in the 
case of homogeneous networks and weaker in the case of media variables. 
As expected, once we introduced ideology in Model 3, this variable turned out to be the 
most powerful predictor of the vote12. This was not at all surprising for the peculiar reasons we have 
mentioned above. Not only has ideology always been important in the Italian political context, but, 
after the collapse of the party system in the early ‘90s, it has also represented the main reference 
point and anchoring for voters to find their way in the new political environment (Campus 2000; 
Baldassarri 2007). Therefore, in our study, ideology played the role occupied by party identification 
in other models (see for instance, Beck et al. 2002 who reported party ID as the most powerful 
predictor of the 1992 American presidential vote and found a weaker, although still significant, 
relationship between ideology and vote). The absence of party ID in our model contributes to 
explaining how the explanatory power of ideology largely surpasses that of all the other variables13. 
The second most significant variable in Model 3, and this is our key finding, appears to be 
the voters’ discussion networks. The variable is largely significant and shows that the political 
composition of discussion networks is strongly related to vote choice even when ideology is 
                                                
12 The reduction in cases included in Models 2 and 3 compared to Model 1 is mostly due to respondents who refused to 
locate themselves on the left-right continuum (about 7% of the sample) and to the fact that Models 2 and 3 exclude from 
the analysis those respondents who could not identify their most frequent discussant’s political orientation (12% of the 
sample) and those who indicated the news program of independent TV network La7 as either their first or second TV 
news choice (9% of the sample), as our goal was to highlight the effects of exposure to the two main Italian TV poles. 
To verify that the loss of cases from Model 1 to Models 2 and 3 does not introduce biases, we reestimated our models 
including only the 695 respondents for whom information is available for all the variables included in Model 3 (listwise 
deletion). The results are comforting. Among the twelve variables in Model 1, all coefficients in the reestimated model 
were markedly similar in magnitude and in the same direction as in Model 1, except for housewives, who exhibited a 
negligible change from -0.072 in the original Model 1 to 0.001 in the resstimated model. 
13 As can be seen at the bottom of Table 3, Model 2 and, especially, Model 3 achieve remarkable values in terms of 
predicted variance. We find these results consistent with similar studies (see for instance Beck et al. 2002; Schmitt-Beck 
2003), also in light of the fact that our dependent variable is not the vote for an individual party, but the vote for one of 
the two coalitions, which, in the 2006 Italian elections, both comprised a large amount of parties with significant 
internal differences in terms of voting motivations. We also emphasize that the largest gain in predicted variance is due 
to the introduction, in Model 2, of variables related to communication intermediaries, while adding ideology in Model 3 
allowed us to better specify our model, especially in terms of the magnitude and statistical significance of the 
coefficients of communication variables, but improved the model’s goodness of fit (from a Nagelkerke R2 of 0.649 up 
to 0.889) to a lesser degree than in the passage from Model 1 to Model 2, in which the Nagelkerke R2 rose from 0.24 to 
0.649. 
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included in the model. It is worth noting that we normalized the variable in order to represent the 
overall effect and to make it comparable with the ideology coefficient. The normalization is 
justified by the results of a previous regression in which we entered the variable on a five-category 
scale and obtained a linear relationship14. In such a way, we find that the impact of the homogeneity 
of political discussion networks on the vote is more than one fourth of that of ideology. The 
magnitude and the significance of the coefficient support our hypothesis that the relationship is 
more remarkable in the case of homogeneous networks, where respondents are embedded in an 
environment that is clearly biased in favor of one side; less strong in the case of networks showing 
only a prevalence of partisan bias, but where a certain degree of disagreement still survives; still 
weaker in the case of a mixed environment. This seems to be consistent with previous research on 
homogeneous/heterogeneous networks (Schmitt-Beck 2003) which has highlighted the power of 
homogeneous networks in blocking contrasting information and eliciting high degrees of group 
conformity.  
As for the other main intermediaries, mass media, our research offers evidence of 
television’s influence, albeit much inferior than interpersonal discussion. Particularly, the impact of 
television variables appears weaker in Model 3 than in Model 2, which confirms our expectations 
that, once selective exposure is taken into account, the effects of television are significantly reduced 
compared to what a simple bivariate analysis would suggest. This leads us to emphasize the 
conspicuous selective exposure which characterizes the Italian case. As highlighted by previous 
research (Sani and Legnante 2002; Legnante 2006), there is a strong relationship between political 
attitudes and the preferred outlet for TV news. In particular, the level of trust in the State television 
and in Mediaset varies remarkably depending on the self-location of the respondents on the left-
right continuum (Sani and Legnante 2002, 132). This helps to explain why in our final model, 
among TV news programs, prevalent exposure to news offered by the State company RAI, which 
were assessed as more balanced in their coverage or slightly more pro-left (as in the case of TG3), 
turned out to be related to the vote for the centre-left, while exposure to Mediaset TV news 
programs does not appear equally significant once ideology is included in the regression equation. 
Our finding that RAI news influenced the vote more than Mediaset, resulting in a net positive effect 
for the centre-left coalition, is also consistent with other Italian research that has identified the same 
phenomenon in both the 2001 and 2006 general elections (Testa et al. 2002; Loera and Testa 2007). 
However, at least two political talk shows, Otto e Mezzo and Matrix, turned out to significantly 
counterbalance the effect of TV news, this time favoring the centre-right by quite large margins. 
This finding leads us to stress that research on media effects must take serious steps to differentiate 
                                                
14 Coefficient values: Homogenous Right = -1.115; Prevalent Right = -1.101; Mixed = 0; Prevalent Left = 1.382; 
Homogeneous Left = 2.240. 
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not only among different media channels and networks, but also among various formats and genres 
within them. Finally, we found a significant correlation between newspaper reading and the vote for 
the centre-left. This result largely confirms the conclusions of earlier studies that have shown that 
Italian left-wing voters tend to read more newspapers than right-wing voters (Legnante, 2002). 
However, since Italian newspapers are quite differentiated by their political alignments, and since 
we did not ask our respondents which newspapers they read in particular, we cannot further 
speculate on the specific impact of this variable. 
More generally, our research offers suggestive evidence of a salient difference between the 
two main intermediaries: while most media variables achieve statistical significance only in Model 
2, but lose a great part of their explicative power in the final regression, the influence and 
significance of homogeneous political networks remain unaltered even when ideology is included in 
the model. In our view, such a difference also emerges more clearly as a consequence of the 
particular morphology of the Italian political communication system. The exposure to a discussion 
network is partly due to voluntary selection, partly due to a number of conditions that determine the 
concrete opportunities for the exchange of political information. As Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995, 
124) have clearly stated, "people often choose their associates and the content of their 
conversations, but each of these choices is, in turn, bounded by an environment that for many 
purposes must be taken as given rather than chosen". This means that, when individuals are located 
in homogeneous and polarized networks, the right conditions for conforming to the group and being 
pushed in a certain direction are present. By contrast, when the mass media as sources of 
information, are pluralistic and are clearly perceived to represent different viewpoints, exposure to 
TV news is often a matter of choice. In Italy, the high degree of polarization and the fact that the 
leader of the centre-right coalition is also the owner of the main pole of commercial television have 
created a high potential for a strong selective exposure.  
 In constructing the relevant variable, we have deliberately stressed this aspect by isolating 
those respondents who watch only RAI TV news and those who watch only Mediaset TV news. 
While, among those who watch only Mediaset, one may presume to find a high percentage of 
people with a clear affiliation with the centre-right, the profile of RAI viewers is more mixed from 
the ideological point of view, ranging from the extreme left to the centre15. Moreover, the message 
coming from RAI was more balanced and more heterogeneous due to the different political 
orientations of the three RAI TV news programs. Such a higher degree of ambivalence and 
                                                
15 As confirmed by our group of respondents, 68% of Mediaset viewers located themselves on the right, 25% on the 
centre, and 7% on the left. Among RAI viewers, 50% located themselves on the left, 35% on the centre, and 15% on the 
right. 
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disagreement has produced an information mix that may well exert a certain impact on less 
ideologically affiliated viewers and those inclined, albeit slightly, toward the centre-left. 
Further evidence of this pattern can be found in the results for the talk shows included in our 
model. The talk show most commonly identified as politically biased, Ballarò, has small and 
insignificant coefficients in Model 3, and the same is true for Porta a Porta. Our data show that the 
audiences of both programs are significantly unbalanced in their ideological leanings16. However, 
both Otto e Mezzo and Matrix, which in our final model display strong and statistically significant 
effects on the vote in favor of the centre-right, seem to fit our causal explanation for mass media 
effects. First, their content is less blatantly partisan than Mediaset’s TV news, as Otto e Mezzo 
employs the aforementioned two-host formula to suggest balance and Matrix’s host tends to avoid 
taking sides and applies a confidential, relaxed posture with all his political guests. As for their 
audiences, Otto e Mezzo is the most “catch-all” program in our model, with the smallest left-right 
gap in viewers and the largest percentage of centrist watchers17. Otto e Mezzo and Matrix’s 
significant effects on the vote are even more remarkable in light of the fact that, as specified above, 
they are the least watched among the talk shows included in our model. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The line of reasoning that has motivated this study contains a major challenge for future research on 
Italian elections. Citizens are exposed to a great deal of political messages that come from two 
intermediaries: discussion networks and mass media. Political information may be more or less 
heterogeneous, more or less dependent on the political environment. Both intermediaries may vary 
considerably in the nature and in the extent of their partisan nature (Beck 1991, Beck et al. 2002). 
An analysis that focuses on citizens’ exposure to the mass media without taking into account the 
networks of interdependent citizens runs the risk of ignoring a fundamental aspect of politics. 
Therefore, only by analyzing both blocks of intermediaries simultaneously, it is possible to acquire 
better knowledge of their impact on contemporary voting. 
Research on Italian voting has largely ignored the role of micro-environmental 
surroundings. Our research has attempted to analyze the Italian case by building on classical voting 
                                                
16 Among respondents who claimed to often watch Ballarò, 64% located themselves on the left, 25% on the centre, 11% 
on the right. Among frequent viewers of Porta a Porta, 48% identified themselves on the right, 30% on the centre, 22% 
on the left. 
17 In our sample, among frequent viewers of Otto e Mezzo, 40% located themselves on the right, 35% in the centre (the 
highest figure for all talk shows), and 25% on the left. Those who often watch Matrix aligned themselves more clearly 
on the right (52%, although more than three-fourths located themselves on the moderate right), while 21% claimed to be 
centrists and 27% identified as leftists. Thus, although conservatives clearly prevail in its audience, Matrix mostly 
draws from moderate conservatives and attracts a proportionally larger share of progressives than all other talk shows 
save the more explicitly partisan Ballarò. 
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studies (Berelson et al. 1954; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944) and on the more recent body of research that 
has rediscovered the impact of families, friends, workplaces, and communities on political choice 
and behavior (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Huckfeldt et al. 2005; Beck et al. 2002; Zuckerman 
2005). We believe that the efforts of the scholars who are trying to revive and update the original 
research of Lazarsfeld and his collaborators should be taken as a positive example. We understand 
that our study is only a preliminary step. Our hope is that a wider and more articulated research 
agenda will follow. 
Despite its preliminary character, our research has shed some light on the processes 
determining voter choices. First, ideology appears to be a key factor. This is a largely expected 
finding confirming previous research that has stressed the high polarization of the current Italian 
political scene. Second, the most important finding is the fact that, holding other factors equal, a 
citizen is significantly more likely to vote for a coalition if he/she has a discussion network that is 
clearly biased in favor of that side. This result suggests that information coming from the voter’s 
proximate social context plays a considerable role and encourages a return, once more, to the 
traditional insights of the Columbia School in order to illuminate contemporary horizons. 
Third, the mass media are certainly the principal actors in the overall transmission of 
political information; however, their clear partisan bias did not turn out to be highly influential. We 
argue that the main reason for this lack of impact lies in the strong selective exposure of Italian 
voters to different sources of information. The consequence of this may well be that new 
information coming from a source that is perceived as openly aligned cannot really affect political 
orientations that are already well formed. Mediaset’s news programming fails to significantly alter 
public opinion because its messages, though ideologically stronger than RAI’s, fail to reach open 
audiences, that is, voters who do not already support those viewpoints. On the other hand, RAI 
news, which were more balanced, appeared to exert at least a modest influence because some 
segments of its audience are more permeable to attitude change. The same pattern was found for 
political talk shows, where those programs that captured the most politically diverse audiences also 
exerted the largest effects, although their cumulative viewership was smaller than other, more 
polarizing shows that turned out not to be influential on the vote.  
However, we do not believe that this evidence allows us to reach the conclusion that mass 
media has only “limited effects”. Answers to such a question cannot be clear-cut and, in any case, 
this aspect requires further research along two main directions: first, a thorough investigation of 
how citizens perceive the partisan bias of the various media; second, the inclusion in the analysis of 
new media. Albeit still not very important as a source of political information in Italy, where a 
notable digital divide still persists (Sartori 2006), we may expect that the new media will become 
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increasingly influential. Of course this evolution is supposed to play a role in the way networks and 
their influence should be conceptualized and analyzed in the future. As Livingstone (2006, 244) has 
observed: “the evocative image that captured, and worried, the public imagination is no longer that 
of the immobile viewer sitting on the sofa silently staring at the screen. Rather, it is of multi-tasking 
in front of the computer, creating as well as receiving messages, networked online as well as 
embedded in noisy worlds of interaction offline”. 
 
Appendix  
 
Design of Citizen Survey 
Our data were collected on the occasion of the 2006 national election by a research team composed 
of researchers from seven Italian universities (Bologna, Catania, Milano Statale, Milano Bicocca, 
Perugia, Trieste, Torino) and sponsored by the MIUR (Italian Ministry for University and 
Research). The analyses are based on data collected through the third wave of a three-panel survey 
executed with self-administered questionnaires sent by mail. The third wave was conducted as a 
post-election survey. Questionnaires were sent to all people (N=2800) who had answered to the first 
wave. Complete responses, defined as questionnaires with 80% of more questions answered, were 
1167, while partial responses, defined as questionnaires with less than 80% questions answered, 
were 103. The resulting response rates, defined according to guidelines set by the American 
Association for Public Opinion Research (2006), were 41.6% (Response Rate 1, which counts 
complete responses only) and 45.3% (Response Rate 2, which counts both complete and partial 
responses).  
Compared to census data, the resulting sample shows no discernible overall gender bias, but slightly 
overestimates adults aged between 45 and 64, especially among men, and underestimates voters 
aged over 75, particularly women. Our sample also over-represents citizens with high-school 
diplomas and under-represents those with elementary education, a phenomenon that typically 
occurs with self-administered questionnaires. After weighting by standard socio-demographic 
variables, however, age biases are effectively eliminated, while biases related to education are 
significantly reduced, although voters with elementary schooling are still under-represented and 
those with intermediary education are over-represented. In terms of voting behavior, the sample 
overestimates turnout, as is usually the case in all surveys, and the pre-weighting sample over-
represents center-left voters. However, the weighted sample reflects real election results quite 
accurately, as the estimated vote percentages for individual parties are within 0.6% of the official 
vote and those for coalitions are within 3.8%. 
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Survey Question Wording and Construction of Variables  
 
Vote in 2006 election 
Respondents coded as 1 if voted for the centre-left; 0 if voted for the centre-right. Abstainers or 
other choices excluded. 
 
Gender 
In the logit analysis, coded 1 for male, 0 for female. 
Political Interest 
“Please locate your interest in politics on a 10-point scale from no interest (1) to the highest level 
(10)”. Coded low interest=1 (if 1-2-3-4-5); medium interest=2 (if 6-7); high interest=3 (if 8-9-10). 
 
Ideology 
"In politics we talk about left and right. Please locate your own political position on a 10-point scale 
from most leftist (1) to most rightist (10)". In the logit analysis, the variable was normalized ranging 
from 0= extreme right to 1= extreme left. 
 
Newspaper and Magazine Reading 
"During the recent electoral campaign, did you read newspaper and magazine articles on politics: 
often, some, a little, never?". The variable was normalized on a 0-1 scale. 
 
Exposure to electoral posters and other propaganda materials 
"During the recent electoral campaign, did you pay attention to electoral posters or other 
propaganda materials: often, some, a little, never?" The variable was normalized on a 0-1 scale. 
 
Most Frequent Discussant 
“Who is the person with whom you most frequently discussed the political news you heard on TV 
or read on newspapers? Husband/wife/partner; another relative (parents, brothers, children); a friend 
(male); a friend (female); a colleague (male); a colleague (female); others”. 
 
Agreement with the respondent’s main discussant 
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This variable has been constructed by matching the respondent’s ideological self-placement (1-10, 
see above) with the perceived political position of the discussant (right; centre-right; centre; centre-
left; left; see below). 
 
  Respondent’s ideological self-placement 
  1-Left 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – Right 
Perceived 
political 
orientation of 
the discussant 
Right Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree Agree 
Centre 
right 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree Agree 
Centre  Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree 
Centre 
left 
Agree Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree 
Left Agree Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree 
 
 
Network homogeneity  
The variable has been built through two steps: 
1) Exposure to dissonant or consonant political views  
"In general, do people you talked with about politics: most hold your same political views; most do 
not share your political views; half hold your same view; half do not".  
By matching this measure with the respondent’s ideological self-evaluation, we build the variable 
“Perceived network” (Left/Mixed/Right). 
  Respondent’s ideological self-placement 
  Left (1-5) Right (6-10) 
Exposure to dissonant or 
consonant political 
views 
Mostly consonant Left Right 
Mostly dissonant Right Left 
Mixed Mixed Mixed 
 
2) Perceived political orientation of the discussant 
"Do you think your discussant’s ideological position is: right; centre-right; centre; centre-left; left, 
do not know?"  
By combining the perceived political orientation of the discussant and the perceived network, we 
obtained a single measure of network ideological homogeneity, as shown in the following table: 
 
  Perceived Network 
  Right Mixed Left 
Perceived political orientation 
of the discussant 
Right Homogeneous Right (1) 
Prevalence 
Right (2) Mixed (3) 
Centre-
Right 
Homogeneous 
Right (1) 
Prevalence 
Right (2) Mixed (3) 
Centre Prevalence Right (2) Mixed (3) 
Prevalence Left 
(3)  
Centre-
Left Mixed (3) 
Prevalence Left 
(4) 
Homogeneous 
Left (5) 
Left Mixed (3) Prevalence Left (4) 
Homogeneous 
Left (5)  
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To simplify comparison with the ideological self-placement variable, the variable was then 
normalized with values included between 0 and 1.  
 
Exposure to TV news 
“During the last month, among the following TV news (RAI1, RAI2, RAI3, TC5, TG4, Studio 
Aperto, TG La7) which are the two you watched more frequently (you may indicate your first and 
your second choice)?”. 
The variable was constructed as follows: Exposure only to RAI TV news: first and second choice 
RA1 TV news or first choice RA1 TV news and second choice missing; Mixed Exposure: first 
choice Mediaset TV news and second choice RAI news or first choice RAI TV news and second 
choice Mediaset TV news; Exposure only to Mediaset: first and second choice Mediaset TV news 
or first choice Mediaset and second choice missing. Respondents who indicated independent TG 
La7 as their first or second choice were excluded from the analysis. 
 
Political Talk shows 
“During the last month, how frequently did you watch (Porta a Porta/Ballarò/Otto e 
Mezzo/Matrix)? Often, Sometimes, Never. The variable was normalized on a 0-1 scale. 
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Tab. 1 – “Who is the person with whom you talked most frequently about the political news heard 
on TV or read on newspapers?” 
  Male Female Total 
Wife/husband (or live-in partners) 195 286 481 
35.9% 48.7% 42.5% 
Another relative (parents, brothers/sisters, children) 120 169 289 
22.1% 28.8% 25.6% 
A friend (male) 135 38 173 
24.8% 6.5% 15.3% 
A friend (female) 7 44 51 
1.3% 7.5% 4.5% 
A co-worker (male) 59 20 79 
10.8% 3.4% 7.0% 
A co-worker (female) 6 19 25 
1.1% 3.2% 2.2% 
others 22 11 33 
4.0% 1.9% 2.9% 
N 544 587 1131 
100% 100% 100% 
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Tab. 2 – Degree of political agreement between respondents and their discussion networks 
depending on R’s political ideology 
 Left Centre-
left 
Centre Centre-
right 
Right All 
sample 
Networks mostly consistent with 
R’s political views 
76.3% 76.2% 22.0% 61.6% 74.3% 59.1% 
Networks only partially consistent 
with R’s political views 
6.9% 11.3% 19.9% 13.1% 8.0% 12.9% 
Networks mostly inconsistent with 
R’s political views 
16.8% 12.5% 58.1% 25.3% 17.7% 28.0% 
N 131 257 241 229 213 971 
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Tab. 3 – Effects of some variables on the vote for coalitions (centre-right = 0; centre-left = 1; 
excluding third parties) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.) 
Gender 
Female = 0 
-0.164 
(0.135) 
-0.088 
(0. 265) 
0.240 
(0.463) 
Age    
18-29 0.142 
(0.284) 
2.190*** 
(0. 613) 
2.913** 
(1.011) 
30-48 0.129 
(0.229) 
1.598** 
(0. 510) 
2.237** 
(0.772) 
49-64 0.038 
(0.204) 
1.090* 
(0.458) 
1.377* 
(0.669) 
Over 65 = 0    
Size of town of residence    
Less than 10.000  -0.123 
(0.169) 
-0.285 
(0.342) 
-0.602 
(0.583) 
10.000 -100.000 -0.111 
(0.158) 
-0.083 
(0.321) 
-0.204 
(0.528) 
Beyond 100.000 = 0    
Education    
Primary or secondary school = 0    
High School 0.196 
(0.334) 
-0.041 
(0.603) 
-1.169 
(1.021) 
Degree (BA, MA, PhD) 0.169 
(0.343) 
-0.121 
(0.620) 
-1.084 
(1.044) 
Professional status    
Entrepreneurs, professionals, 
autonomous workers 
-0.247 
(0.253) 
-1.038 
(0.541) 
-0.436 
(0.755) 
Employees 0.392 
(0.218) 
-0.565 
(0.461) 
-0.163 
(0.652) 
Students and unemployed -0.074 
(0.297) 
-0.786 
(0.583) 
0.110 
(0.995) 
Housewives -0.072 
(0.254) 
0.302 
(0.530) 
1.383 
(0.870) 
Retired = 0    
Political Interest  -0.066 
(0.598) 
0.534 
(1.000) 
Discussion Network Ideological 
Homogeneity (right-left) 
 4.597*** 
(0.433) 
4.206*** 
(0.826) 
Newspaper and magazine reading  0.355 
(0.428) 
1.913** 
(0.746) 
Attention to campaign 
communications 
 0.059 
(0.445) 
0.530 
(0.692) 
Exposure to TV news    
Only RAI TV news  1.221*** 
(0.283) 
1.254** 
(0.472) 
Mixed = 0    
Only Mediaset TV news  -1.128*** 
(0.345) 
-0.399 
(0.589) 
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Exposure to political talk-shows    
Porta a Porta   -0.530 
(0.368) 
0.536 
(0.610) 
Ballarò  2.104*** 
(0.359) 
0.714 
(0.600) 
Otto e Mezzo  -1.943*** 
(0.400) 
-1.763** 
(0.627) 
Matrix  -0.760* 
(0.387) 
-2.010** 
(0.692) 
Ideology (right-left)   15.731*** 
(1.726) 
    
N 1108 700 695 
% predicted 54.7% 84.9% 94.9% 
Nagelkerke R2 0.240 0.649 0.889 
 
Note: *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001 
